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THE IMPACT OF WILDLIFE DAMAGE ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN
WISCONSIN
SCOTT R. CRAVEN, Department of Wildlife Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

ABSTRACT: Wildlife damage caused by species normally managed as game animals or furbearers should be of major
concern to wildlife managers and various user groups: hunters, trappers, and other outdoor recreationists. Real or potential
damage may be used as an important factor in determining population levels, harvest goals, and distribution of white-tailed
deer and Canada geese in Wisconsin. In any state where private land and agriculture are important, such a strategy could
reduce wildlife populations and associated recreational opportunities. Recent surveys in Wisconsin have quantified the
amount and distribution of deer, goose, and turkey damage in Wisconsin. These data allow comparisons between wildlife
damage and total agricultural production, other causes of crop loss, and the positive economic impact of these species.
Additionally, comparisons are possible between perceived losses and maximum potential losses. A review of the problems
caused by each animal provides a framework to discuss the issue of wildlife damage to farm crops and the implications for
managers and resource users. The double- crested cormorant provides a special example of a resource management problem
with wildlife damage.
Proc. Vertebr. Pest Conf. (A.C. Crabb and R.E. Marsh, Eds.),
Printed at Univ. of Calif., Davis. 13:9-13, 1988

Wildlife damage control has become an increasingly
well recognized, important, and organized component of
wildlife management. Several major national/international
conferences (Vertebrate Pest Conference, Eastern Wildlife
Damage Conference, Great Plains Wildlife Damage Conference) are well attended, papers on the subject are well
represented in the professional literature, the APHIS-ADC
program has been well received, and animal damage problems, or the potential for them, are considered an integral part
of wildlife management programs. Examples of the latter
include concern over damage to valuable fisheries related to
sea otter relocations on the Pacific Coast, potential livestock
losses associated with timber wolf restoration in the northern
Rocky Mountains, and a reconsideration of white-tailed deer
population goals in many agricultural areas of the Midwestern and Eastern United States.
In Wisconsin, wildlife damage control has become a
major state program. Legislation created the Wisconsin
Wildlife Damage Control Program in 1983 with an annual
budget of about $1 million derived from a $1 surcharge on
hunting licenses (see Hygnstrom and Craven 1985). The
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) has a
full-time animal damage coordinator, the APHIS-ADC program has been very successful, and there have been several
surveys to document the extent and characteristics of damage
caused by key wildlife species. The result is an integrated
program to assist fanners with damage problems through
direct personal attention, provision of abatement materials,
or payment of compensation.
The initiative for the current level of assistance came
from intensive pressure from Wisconsin's agricultural community. Wildlife managers were aware of the problems but
there was no consensus as to where the financial responsibil-
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ity for wildlife damage should be placed, or even if there was
a responsibility. In fact, damage caused by species normally
managed as game animals or furbearers should be of major
concern to wildlife managers and various user groups:
hunters, trappers, and other outdoor recreationists. Real or
potential damage has become an important factor in the
determination of population levels, harvest goals, and distribution of white-tailed deer and Canada geese in Wisconsin.
In any state where private land and agriculture are important,
such a strategy can lead to a reduction in wildlife populations
and associated recreational opportunities.
Recent surveys in Wisconsin quantified the amount and
distribution of deer, goose, and wild turkey damage. These
data allow comparisons between wildlife damage and total
agricultural production, other causes of crop loss, and the
positive economic impact of these species. Additionally
perceived losses and maximum potential losses can be
compared. The "farm crisis" of the 1980s apparently reduced
the tolerance for wildlife on agricultural lands and excessive
publicity and misconceptions about wildlife damage contributed to a strong negative image for some species.
The status of an animal as a "game" species or an
"endangered" species greatly complicates a control program.
Unlike rodents and pest birds, such species often provide
enormous economic and recreational opportunities. Victims
of damage problems must contend with a general lack of
lethal control alternatives, permits and other legal restrictions.
I will use a brief review of 4 species in Wisconsin and
related survey results to build a case for the current importance of wildlife damage control in wildlife management and
the risk it represents to continued wildlife abundance, particularly on agricultural lands. Based on experience in

Wisconsin, I will offer recommendations for assistance programs and education that could help restore a more favorable
image for key wildlife species in agricultural habitat. Creative solutions to wildlife damage problems can and must
offer alternatives to population reduction.
The first 2 species I will review have a long history of
problems in Wisconsin. Deer and geese are highly visible,
well studied, and the problems associated with them are well
publicized. Deer problems are statewide but more acute in
central and southwestern Wisconsin. Goose problems are
concentrated in east-central Wisconsin around Horicon
National Wildlife Refuge. Intense publicity, strong emotions, a weak farm economy, and other unique factors have
made deer and goose damage much more complex issues than
if they were based only on dollars lost Turkey and cormorant
problems are very recent, more localized, and involve far
fewer animals, but are nonetheless complex.
Canada Geese
Horicon Marsh is known throughout North America as a
fall concentration point for thousands of migrating Canada
geese (Branta canadensis). Historically, this phenomenon
began as recently as 1950 concurrent with the development
of Horicon National Wildlife Refuge. The refuge area
provided sanctuary and water and the surrounding agricultural land provided abundant food resources, a situation
similar to numerous other waterfowl refuges across the
United States. Fall goose population levels did not exceed
100,000 until the 1960s. The large goose "spectacle" attracted thousands of tourists and hunters to the area.
As the goose flock continued to grow throughout the
1960s and early 1970s, farmers became increasingly dissatisfied with the goose management system. Crop depredations increased, changes in goose harvest management deprived farmers of any significant opportunity to charge
hunters for hunting opportunity, and the relationship between
the agricultural community and natural resource agencies
deteriorated. Periodic demands for relief from crop depredation led to major management programs in the mid-1960s and
1970s. For an excellent review of problems and programs
around Horicon see Reeves et al. (1968) and Hunt (1984).
The so-called "goose wars" of 1975-1980 led to a
dramatic decline in the Horicon area goose population. Less
geese resulted in lower harvest quotas and thus a reduced
harvest. Area farmers appeared satisfied that their demands
had been met and there were a few years of relative peace.
The goose flock rebounded from a 20-year population
low in 1981 to near record peak levels by 1986 and 1987
(Table 1). Predictably, agricultural unrest increased with
flock size. Between 1985 and 1987 we collected data on the
positive and negative impact of the geese in the Horicon area.
These data provided managers an opportunity to base decisions on objective criteria.
The geese did in fact cause substantial crop losses. In
both 1985 and 1986 farmers reported losses of about $1.6
million. Within 10-20 km of Horicon refuge, 43% of the
farmers felt their losses were unacceptable. Crops most
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Table 1. Wisconsin Canada Goose Harvest Statistics, 19801987.

1

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Survey Data.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service count of Canada geese in Mississippi Valley
Population range.
2

frequently damaged were alfalfa, winter wheat, and corn, and
damage took several forms in addition to direct consumption.
Data suggested that tolerance for goose damage was much
less than that reported for deer damage. In 1985, about half
of the area farmers believed that an increase in the goose
harvest would lead to a decrease in crop damage. About half
of those individuals changed their minds in 1986 after a near
doubling of the harvest quota. However, note in Table 1 that
the actual harvest did not reflect the increased quota.
On the other side of the ledger, interviews with tourists,
car counters, and roadside observations indicated that 160180 thousand people visited the Horicon area in 1986 and
1987 to see geese and other marsh wildlife. Visitors traveled
an average of 102 miles, one-way and collectively spent
about $2 million in the area. A mail-back questionnaire to
area businesses suggested total expenditures by goose watchers and hunters of almost $7 million.
Farmers did not recognize the economic value of the
goose flock to the Horicon area; probably because they do not
share in the economic benefits.
In 1988 the damage issue remains the key factor in goose
management decisions. The trend is toward increased harvest quotas and a decrease in the goose population at Horicon.
History suggests that this approach has done little more than
contribute to a cyclic outbreak of problems. Fortunately,
there are signs that other programs such as the effective
response of the new APHIS-ADC abatement program at
Horicon, a new APHIS-ADC winter wheat "lure crop" project, a popular hunter/farmer referral system, and the financial
resources of the 1983 Wisconsin Wildlife Damage Program

may provide a long-term solution to the problems that have
plagued Horicon.

Table 3. Wisconsin Deer Damage Compared with 1983
Value of Crops Raised

White-tailed Deer
Excellent habitat, especially in areas of mixed woodlands and agricultural lands, a series of mild-to-moderate
winters, and conservative harvests led to an increase in the
deer herd to about 1 million animals by 1985 (Table 2).
Complaints increased as deer caused substantial losses to
corn, fruit, alfalfa, and other farm products. During 1983-84
statewide damage was estimated at $36.7 million (Table 3).
Losses represented only 1.4% of total Wisconsin agricultural
production for that period. Over half the total damage was to
corn and 55% of all Wisconsin farms reported corn damage
(average loss $438 per farm). Despite a variety of abatement
and compensation programs, damage continued at intolerable levels for some farmers.
In another context the white-tailed deer is probably the
most popular and important wild animal in Wisconsin.
During the annual 9-day November gun deer hunting season
650-750 thousand hunters invade Wisconsin's 31,000 square
miles of deer range. Recent harvests have ranged from 250300 thousand deer. Hunter expenditures, meat and hide
values, and license sales exceed $200 million (U.S. Fish and
that need to be harvested is calculated and hunting regulations are set accordingly. For an excellent review of deer
management in Wisconsin see Creed et al. (1984).
The system just described has been very successful but
the impact of an adjustment in the population goal-setting
procedure is obvious. A move toward crop damage reduction
by deer population reduction affects recreational opportunity
and vice versa. Survey data indicated that in agricultural
areas with high deer densities, 34-5 7% of the farmers favored
a decrease in herd size. In the same areas, 9-27% reported
substantial-to-severe damage and 9-33% felt damage levels
were unreasonable. The result has been a major management
effort to reevaluate population goals in predominantly agricultural areas. Herd reduction via increased harvests began
about 1982 and 1983 and culminated with record numbers of
special tags to take more deer (especially antlerless animals)
in 1985-87 (Table 2). As expected, the overall harvest began
a slow decline in 1986.

Table 2. Wisconsin White-tailed Deer Harvest Statistics,
1982-1987.
9-day

1
2

Deer

Year

gun season
harvest1

herd
status

Number of
special tags2

1982

182,700

increasing

126,505

1983

197,600

increasing

165,967

1984

255,900

increasing

194,906

1985

274,300

1 million+

279,890

1986

259,200

950,000

234,425

1987

250,100

1 million

261,280

Cormorants
The double-crested cormorant (Phalacrocorax auritus) is
not a game bird but the species does illustrate another difficult
problem for wildlife management. Historically, cormorant
populations in the Great Lakes region fluctuated widely. In
1972, with a population of only 66 pairs in 3 colonies, the
double-crested cormorant was listed as an endangered species in Wisconsin. In addition to the protection afforded to
an endangered species, managers took steps to increase the
cormorant population. A total of 794 nesting platforms (see
Meier 1981) were erected on islands in Green Bay and at
several inland waters colonies during the 1970s. Because of
these, and perhaps other reasons, cormorant populations
increased rapidly, especially in Green Bay and in the Apostle

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Statistics.
"Hunter's Choice" or "antlerless only" tags, basic season is bucks only.

Wildlife Service, 1985 Survey data). The benefits of a long
archery hunting season and the aesthetic value of observing
deer add unknown amounts to these figures.
In Wisconsin, deer are managed in 96 deer management
units averaging about 580 square miles in size. The population goal for each unit is set based on a delicate balance
between opposing needs: the need to minimize crop damage
and deer-car collisions on the one hand; the need to maximize
hunting opportunity and non-consumptive values on the
other. Once set, the population goals are achieved by setting
harvest quotas for each unit. The number of deer of each sex
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Islands on Lake Superior. By 1985 there were at least 2,217
nesting pairs in 22 colonies, 1,127 in Green Bay alone.
As the cormorant populations increased so did complaints from commercial fishermen in both Green Bay and the
Apostle Islands. Fishermen claimed substantial losses of
yellow perch and whitefish to direct consumption by cormorants and to gilling and scarring of captured fish when
cormorants fed freely within the large pound net traps
commonly used (Craven and Lev 1987). Practical abatement
techniques were not available and the cormorants could not
be killed because of their status as an endangered species.
In 1986 the cormorant was delisted. Artificial nesting
structures in Green Bay were all lost to weather and high
water levels or were removed. The Lower Green Bay Action
Plan, a broad environmental plan for Green Bay, suggests
that nothing be done to encourage cormorant populations.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has issued permits to
commercial fishermen to control (kill) problem birds. To
date, no birds have been shot. During the summer of
1987, on Gravelly island not far from the mouth of Green
Bay, unidentified intruders destroyed hundreds of cormorant
eggs. There is now some indication that the Wisconsin
cormorant population may be stabilizing (S. Matteson,
WDNR, pers. comm.).
Turkeys
The wild turkey (Meleagris gallopavo) was extirpated
from Wisconsin during the late 1800s. Repeated attempts to
reintroduce turkeys during the mid 1900s met with limited or
no success. However, in 1974 the WDNR and Missouri
Department of Conservation agreed on a program that would
send Wisconsin ruffed grouse (Bonasa umbellus) to Missouri
in exchange for wild-trapped Missouri turkeys. Wild stock
proved to be the key to success. The first release of 45
Missouri turkeys took place in the heavily wooded driftless
region of southwestern Wisconsin in 1976. In just over a
decade, continued release and relocations, coupled with
natural population growth and range expansion, produced a
turkey flock estimated at 25-40,000 birds.
The return of wild turkeys was hailed as a tremendous
success for wildlife management. Limited hunting began in
1983 and increased to include 11,000 participants during the
1988 spring season. Landowners were very receptive to the
presence of turkeys and in many cases were very protective
of the initial flocks.
By 1987 there were indications that the positive feeling
toward the turkey program had changed. Hunters, woodland
owners, and the general public remained enthusiastic but the
agricultural community began to react in terms of "too many"
turkeys and problems with crop damage. Local DNR offices
began to receive complaints about turkey damage in alfalfa,
corn, and small grains. The literature and personal communication offered no indication that turkeys caused serious
problems anywhere in primary turkey range. Field investigations of complaints were inconclusive.
We conducted a random mail-back questionnaire survey
of 508 farmers in the 6 Wisconsin counties with highest

turkey densities in December 1987 and January 1988. A
preliminary analysis suggests that about 25% of the area
farmers perceive turkeys as a "medium" to "large" problem.
Only 3 of 262 respondents reported damage in excess of $500.
Most farmers with damage considered it to be "minor" or
"moderate" and less than $100. These data do not suggest a
major financial problem. However, virtually all farmers
reported an increasing turkey flock and about half equate
more turkeys with more damage. Farmers reported virtually
no individual efforts to abate turkey damage.
When offered a choice of solutions to the turkey problem, about 60% of the farmers favored a fall hunting season
for turkeys of any sex or age. The implication was clear that
farmers wanted a reduction in the turkey flock. The WDNR
response was to consider a limited fall season as early as 1989.
I have attempted to present a brief overview of 4 very
complicated wildlife damage problems in Wisconsin which
involve species not traditionally considered "vertebrate
pests." A key reference was provided in each case if the reader
desires more detail. In addition, several papers in production
will expand on the problems and data related to turkey, geese,
and deer. In all 4 cases populations of an animal with
important recreational or social value were (or will be)
reduced in response to economic loss to one sector of society.
Intuitively, reduced populations should reduce damage but
this relationship does not appear to be well established.
Further, population reductions could reduce opportunities for
successful harvest or non-consumptive activities.
There are several important issues to consider:
First, the severity of loss versus the value of the wildlife.
As noted for deer and geese the positive economic impact of
these species far exceeds the total damage they cause. For
deer and geese, sociologists and economists in Wisconsin
report that there is substantial additional "surplus value"
associated with both species (Heberlein and Bishop 1986). In
other words hunters and other user groups would be willing
to expend far more for their recreation than they actually do.
Second, the number of farmers affected. There can be no
question that some farmers suffer disastrous losses to wildlife. However, repeated surveys suggest that severe losses are
restricted to a small percentage of all farmers. In fact, in many
cases, farmers report small or no losses, tolerance for minor
problems, and enjoyment of the wildlife in question. There
is no consensus. Media attention focuses on vocal farmers
with severe losses with a resultant public impression of a
universal problem.
Third, problems with reported losses. Surveys ultimately lead to a bottom line of total damage caused by a
species for areaX over time Y. At first glance the figure seems
very large (i.e., $1.6 million for goose damage) and impossible to compensate for. In reality, such a figure represents
perceived loss. Real loss could be more or less. With Canada
geese at Horicon Marsh a crude model which incorporated
the number of geese, length of stay, daily consumption, food
habits and a few basic assumptions suggested a maximum
real loss of less than half of the $ 1.6 million figure. Furthermore, a survey "total" includes many small claims for which
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farmers report some tolerance.
The basic problem remains the presence of wildlife, a
publicly "owned" resource on private land. The wildlife
resource has great value and society expects private landowners, including farmers, to be responsible stewards of the
resource. However, there is little or no incentive for landowners to do just that unless their personal interests happen to
mesh with those of society. Surveys strongly suggest that if
farmers do not share in the economic benefits derived from
wildlife they do not even recognize them as valid. In the case
of wildlife damage society often expects the private landowner to sustain the damage or take personal steps to abate
it. That system has not been successful and the resource
ultimately loses ground; society will in turn lose opportunities derived from wildlife.
The answer is neither singular nor simple. 1 offer the
following observations:
(1) The value of key wildlife species suggests that a
greater public investment in wildlife management, including
damage control, is certainly justified.
(2) In the case of a species restoration program like the
double-crested cormorant, potential damage problems must
be anticipated. A program for dealing with damage should be
in hand before the program proceeds.
(3) The "gut objection" of some managers and resource
users to financial compensation for wildlife damage must be
overcome. Survey data strongly suggest that farmer toler
ance, possible differences between perceived and real dam
age, and relatively low numbers of farmers with serious
problems, all contribute to a substantial reduction in the"total
loss" figures often used in discussions of wildlife damage.
Thus the burden of compensation is not as staggering as it
may appear at first glance. An upturn in the farm economy
would undoubtedly help the situation.
(4) The Wisconsin program, which emphasizes costshared abatement first and compensation only after abatement fails or is judged impractical, has proven very successful. A one time or periodic investment in effective abatement
makes more sense than perennial compensation payments.
(5) Damage problems caused by key wildlife species are
very different than traditional pest problems and deserve
critical and innovative attention in the pest and wildlife
management communities—which in practice should be one

and the same.
(6) In agricultural areas, especially in the Eastern United
States where most land is in private ownership, the landowner/farmer must be brought into the economics of wildlife.
The production of wildlife on private farmland is no more a
free process than the production of beef or pork.
In summary, some hard management decisions will be
necessary to maintain wildlife abundance in agricultural
areas. The alternative is to reduce populations to levels where
there are not problems. Ultimately no wildlife equals no
problems, but for wildlife managers and users that equation
is intolerable. We need to give compensation a better look,
seek out adequate funding, continue development of better
abatement tools, and develop a creative way to make fanners
a full partner in wildlife management.
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